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Background: A lower tax morality leads to an increased readiness to become active 
in the unofficial economy and causes the lack of public revenues. Objectives: The aim 
of this paper is to investigate determinants that shape tax morale of Croatian citizens. 
Methods/Approach: An ordered logit model is employed to evaluate which 
determinants shape tax morale of Croatian citizens. Data for the research were 
collected from 2,000 face-to-face interviews conducted in Croatia in late 2015. 
Results: The descriptive analysis illustrates that 52 percent of respondents reported a 
high level of tax morale, 26 percent of respondents have a low tax morale, while 8 
and 14 percent have a mid-low and a mid-high tax morale, respectively. The ordered 
logit analysis revealed that gender, age, financial situation, region, and participation 
in the unofficial economy have an impact on the tax morale. Conclusions: Besides 
socio-demographic, socio-economic, and spatial determinants, a great number of 
sanctions for participation in informal activities also shapes tax morale of the Croatian 
citizens. More precisely, marginal effects show that those perceiving the expected 
sanctions as "normal tax or social security contributions due, plus a fine or a prison 
sentence" have by 6.3 percentage points higher probability of reporting the highest 
tax morale than others. 
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Introduction 
Luttmer et al. (2014) in their seminal work define tax morale “as an umbrella term 
capturing nonpecuniary motivations for tax compliance as well as factors that fall 
outside the standard, expected utility framework”. They argue that Allingham et al. 
(1972) have constructed the benchmark economic model of tax evasion, in which the 
most important parameters having an effect on tax evasion are the tax rate, the 
detection risk, and the punishment for the detected individuals who evade paying 
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cost of being caught and punished is smaller than the benefit from tax evasion. Since 
this contribution, there has been an increased interest in analysing and enhancing the 
knowledge on “tax morale”. Modern fiscal literature by it means improving voluntary 
compliance with tax regulation and achieving a social norm of compliance (Wenzel, 
2005a; 2005b).  
 Luttmer et al. (2014) state that taxpayers may have some intrinsic motivation, which 
is a key instrument that helps them to respect the law and pay taxes or feel some 
moral guilt for failure to comply. They may respect the law due to the groups of various 
reasons. The first group is reciprocal motivations, i.e. the readiness to pay taxes in 
exchange for goods and services that the state provides to all citizens even though 
their monetary benefits would be bigger if they did not pay taxes (Luttmer et al., 2014). 
The second group may be various forms of the pressure from peer behaviour and the 
prospect of social recognition or sanctions from friends, neighbours, family members 
or co-workers. The third group consists of cultural or social norms like traditions, 
prevailing values and believes that can affect compliance and morale, but are also 
under the influence of various forms of motivation and the peers’ sensitivity. The fourth 
group includes the level of tax knowledge or tax literacy that influences compliance 
attitudes and decisions of current and potential taxpayers (Nichita, 2015). The fifth 
group contains deviations from utility maximization and information imperfections (for 
example, taxpayers may over- or underestimate the probability of being caught in tax 
evasion or may show loss aversion). Finally, the last group contains a policy and 
administration aspect: the behaviour and practice of the tax administration and the 
perceived tax burden, the tax structure in general as well as the tax enforcement 
strategy can influence taxpayers’ decision to pay taxes (Torgler et al., 2005). 
 There are two main types of tax behaviour: compliance, which is either voluntary 
or enforced; and noncompliance that can be in the form of tax evasion or tax 
avoidance (OECD/FIIAPP, 2015). Many authors (Lago-Peñas et al., 2010; Kogler et al., 
2013; Luttmer et al., 2014) believe that tax morale plays an important role in the tax 
compliance, although very often they see enforcement as the main reason of 
compliance. The main determinants of the tax morale expressing dissent against 
formal institutions are often connected with the existing or perceived infringement of 
the principle of equality by the same public authority (Chong et al., 2007). In particular, 
the tax policy and social security system are defined by regulations, which a part of 
the population judges as unfair according to the principle of equality and to its 
corollary, the ability-to-pay principle. As an outcome, people who withdraw from their 
fiscal obligations and accept a negative tax morale are able to justify their 
noncompliance with the rule. Such a negative tax morale is not only a causal element 
of the informal economy; it is very often also a cause of exclusion from a legal system 
expecting duties, but also from various rights. 
 These considerations suggest that designing tax measures in accordance with the 
principle of equality is fundamental for increasing their effectiveness and for 
promoting a shift from the negative to the positive tax morale. The shift from the 
negative to the positive tax morale is the transformation of noncompliance into 
compliance, which is an essential condition for promoting the stable inclusion into the 
formal world of work and compliance regarding tax and social security obligations. 
 The aim of this paper is to evaluate the determinants that shape tax morale of 
Croatian citizens. To do this, an ordered logit model is conducted based on data 
collected in Croatia in 2015. Croatia is a post-transition society, which emerged from 
a socialist system, and experienced damages of the Homeland war in the 1990s. It is 
important to underline that the practices and principles of tax systems under socialism 
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et al., 2014). Furthermore, Schneider (2017) estimates that Croatia is a country with one 
of the highest level of the undeclared economy among all EU-28 member states in 
2015 (27.7% of GDP), only Bulgaria (30.6 % of GDP) and Romania (28.0 % of GDP) have 
higher levels of the undeclared economy, while the EU-28 average is 18.3% of GDP. 
Accordingly, the mentioned facts are the main motivation and reason for choosing 
Croatia as a country for research.  
 This paper is the first that examines the impact of expected size of sanction for 
participation in informal activities and various socio-demographic, socio-economic, 
and spatial factors on tax morale in Croatia. The literature about informal economy 
reveals that higher tax morale leads to a smaller shadow economy (Torgler et al., 2007; 
Torgler et al., 2009) and the lower levels of participation in the informal economy 
(Williams et al., 2015; Williams et al., 2016a; Windebank et al., 2017; Franić et al., 2017). 
Thus, this article contributes to a better understanding of the determinants of tax 
morale as well as informal economy in Croatia. The paper provides an overview of the 
literature in Section 2 and a summary of the empirical evidence of the socio-
economic and institutional determinants of tax morale in the following sections. 
 
Literature review 
Nerré (2008) deems that a tax culture is a specific characteristic of a particular 
country. It was coined by the tradition of taxation (having in mind various forms of 
taxes) on the one side, and by the interaction of the stakeholders and the cultural 
values like honesty, justice or also a sense of duty on the other side. Lago-Peñas et al. 
(2010) divide the literature on the tax culture into two categories. First group consists 
of those studies oriented only on one country, but after then authors usually compare 
international or regional variations and changes over time. Examples of such 
approach are researches Torgler (2005a), Martínez-Vázquez et al. (2009), Nerré et al. 
(2014), and Williams et al. (2014). Torgler (2005a) examine the impact of direct 
democracy on tax morale in Switzerland, and concluded that “direct democratic 
rights have a significantly positive effect on tax morale”. Martínez-Vázquez et al. (2009) 
argue that an increased level of the tax morale in Spain was an endogenous variable 
influenced primarily by improved tax policy and tax administration reforms. Nerré et 
al. (2014), as several more important reasons for low tax morale in Serbia, mention high 
tax rates, unjust distribution of tax burden and lack of detection, while other less 
important reasons were corruption among civil servants and a lack of civic 
conscience. Williams et al. (2014) conducted a resesarch for Bulgaria in 2013 and have 
propounded an explanation for the undeclared economy, which claims the following 
“the greater is the asymmetry between formal and informal institutions (i.e., citizens’ 
civic morality and state morality), the greater is the likelihood of participation in the 
undeclared economy, and vice versa”. 
 Similar to one measurement approach on the tax morale, there is a possibility to 
evaluate the magnitude of tax morale via surveys. Torgler et al. (2005) state that “The 
World Values Survey provides a valuable data source for getting internationally 
comparable information on tax morale”. They explain that the mentioned Survey uses 
the following question: “Please tell us for each of the following statements whether 
you think it can always be justified, never be justified, or something in between: … 
Cheating on tax if you have the chance”. The question leads to a ten-scale index of 
tax morale with the two extreme points “never justified” and “always justified”. The 
ten-point scale has been integrated into a four-point scale (from 0 to 3), with the value 
3 for “never justifiable”. According to results from various years, the highest share of 
the people that state how tax evasion is never justified has been recorded in Japan 
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value decreases to around 40% in Portugal, the Netherlands and Finland and is even 
lower in Belgium (below 35%).  
Another approach to measuring tax morale is by using the International Social Survey 
Programme (ISSP). This cross-national collaboration began in 1983 and has grown to 
more than 30, mostly European, countries (Croatia has been a member since 2005) 
and enables various types of social science projects. From time to time, the 
Programme asks the following question: “Do you feel it is wrong or not wrong if a 
taxpayer does not report all of his or her income in order to pay less personal income 
taxes? (1= not wrong, 2= a bit wrong, 3= wrong, 4=seriously wrong)”. ISSP Mean Tax 
Morale Values are low for Austria, Germany, Ireland and France and high for Australia, 
Sweden, Spain and Japan. Unfortunately, there is little overlapping of the results from 
various surveys and it is almost impossible to compare the variables from different 
sources (Schneider, 2011). 
 Unlike the researchers oriented only on one country, the second group includes 
researches that make use of cross-national data. Using data from six countries, Torgler 
(2004) concludes that tax morale increases with age and is lower for self-employed, 
unemployed, and upper class taxpayers. Financial satisfaction, strong GDP growth, 
institutional quality, national pride, trust in government and legal system increase tax 
morale and decrease tax evasion. Similar results were obtained by other researches 
that added to the existing knowledge or provide possible explanations. Thus, Tittle 
(1980) deems that significantly higher tax morale recorded by women is caused by 
the facts that females are more compliant than males, and thus, are more risk averse. 
Furthermore, the modern female generations are much more independent than the 
former generations, and it is assumed that they will comply less (Torgler et al., 2005). As 
for elderly people, Tittle (1980) argues that they are more sensitive to the threats of 
sanctions than others. Furthermore, Torgler et al. (2005) argue that older people 
attained their social stakes over the years, as property or social status, and that they 
are more sensitive to the reactions from others. Consequently, they also state that their 
potential costs of sanction due to tax evasion increase. Chong et al. (2007) argue that 
high or increased income inequality, in combination with unsatisfactory quality of 
institutions, is one of the most important determinants of low tax morale. After the 
analysis of the tax culture of the 50 countries surveyed, Tsakumis et al. (2007) state that 
cultural framework based on male-oriented individualism, causes lower readiness to 
pay taxes. Finally, Lago-Peñas et al. (2010) claim that well educated taxpayers are 
supposed to know more about the fiscal legislations and tax because they are more 
aware of the importance of public goods provided by the state. 
 
Methodology 
To evaluate which socio-economic, socio-demographic, and spatial determinants 
shape tax morale of the Croatian citizens, data were collected from 2,000 face-to-
face interviews conducted in Croatia between August 20th and October 9th 2015. 
The survey was conducted by well-known Croatian market research agency “Ipsos 
Puls”. To get a nationally representative sample of the population, the sample was 
drawn according to official data gather in Census 2011 by the Croatian Bureau of 
Statistics and a two-way stratified random sample was used according to regions and 
settlement size. In each surveyed household, one respondent aged 18 years and older 
was selected using the “first birthday” method. To collect the data, trained 
professional interviewers used face-to-face methodology (TAPI – Tablet Assisted 
Personal Interview). Furthermore, to balance under- and over-representation in the 
sample, weighting procedure based on age, gender, education, region and 
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these surveys target different members of the population and together with the 
appropriate sampling method, these are the main factors that make the survey as 
representative as possible. On the other hand, a weakness of cross-sectional sample 
surveys is their inability to track change over time.   
Table 1 
The list of variables used in the analysis 
Variables Definition Values # of 
missing 
values 
Dependent variable:   
Tax morale A categorical variable which estimates the level 
of tax morale using the following survey question:  
“Now I would like to know how you assess various 
behaviours. For each of them, please tell me to 
what extent you find it acceptable or not. Please 
use the following 10-point Likert scale: ‘1’ means 
that you find it ‘absolutely unacceptable’ and 
‘10’ means that you find it ‘absolutely 
acceptable’:... Someone evades taxes by not or 
only partially declaring income.” 
The 10-point scale has been 
recoded into a four-point scale:  
1 = low tax morale (responses 
from 4 through 10); 
value 2 = mid low tax morale 
(response 3); 
value 3 = mid high tax morale 
(response 2); value 4 = high tax 
morale (response 1 “completely 
disagree”). 
38 
Explanatory variables:  
Gender A dummy variable indicating the respondent’s 
gender. 
0 = men; 
1 = women. 
0 
Age An interval variable indicating the exact age of 
the respondent. 





A categorical variable for the employment 
status of the respondents. 
1 = employed; 
2 = self-employed; 
3 = unemployed; 
4 = retired; 




A categorical variable for the respondent 
perception regarding its financial situation. 
1 = struggling; 
2 = maintaining; 
3 = just comfortable or no 
money problems. 
45 
Household size A categorical variable which measures the size 
of the respondent’s household. 
1 = one person; 
2 = two persons; 
3 = three persons; 
4 = four or more people. 
0 
Region A categorical variable for the region to which 
the respondent belongs. 
1 = Zagreb and surroundings; 
2 = North Croatia; 
3 = Slavonia; 
4 = Lika and Banovina; 
5 = Gorski Kotar, Hrvatsko 
Primorje and Istria; 




A dummy variable which indicates participation 
in undeclared work using the following survey 
question: 
“Did you yourself carry out any undeclared paid 
activities in the last 12 months?” 
0 = no; 




services on the 
informal market 
A dummy variable which indicates purchasing 
goods and services on the informal market using 
the following survey question: 
“Have you in the last 12 months paid for any 
goods or services of which you had a good 
reason to assume that they included undeclared 
work (e.g. because there was no invoice or VAT 
receipt)?” 
0 = no; 




A categorical variable describing the expected 
size of sanctions when someone is engaged in 
unregistered activities. 
1 = normal tax or social security 
contributions due, but no fine; 
2 = normal tax or social security 
contributions due, plus a fine or 
a prison. 
344 
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 In this paper the dependent variable is tax morale that measures individuals’ 
attitude about the moral obligation to pay taxes. To estimate the level of tax morale 
from the survey, the following question is used: “Now I would like to know how you 
assess various behaviours. For each of them, please tell me to what extent you find it 
acceptable or not. Please use the following 10-point Likert scale: ‘1’ means that you 
find it ‘absolutely unacceptable’ and ‘10’ means that you find it ‘absolutely 
acceptable’:... Someone evades taxes by not or only partially declaring income.” As 
in Torgler (2004), and Torgler et al. (2009), the 10-point scale has been redefined into 
a four point scale (1, 2, 3, 4), with the value 4 for “absolutely unacceptable”. 
Responses 4 through 10 were integrated into a value 1 due to lack of variance among 
them. The explanatory variables used to analyse the determinants of tax morale were 
selected based on previous studies of the informal economy and tax morale (Torgler 
2004; Williams et al., 2017; Williams et al., 2018). The list of used variables is shown in 
Table 1. Given that the data contain missing values (i.e. ‘don’t know’ and refusal), 
multiple imputation procedure was applied to predict the values (Rubin, 1987, 
Royston, 2004; Schafer et al., 2002). More precisely, using a system of chained 
equations, twenty five imputations were simulated for each missing value. 
 Given that the dependent variable is an ordered categorical variable, an ordered 
logit model is here applied and then the average marginal effects are calculated. 




1  if  
i i i








where 1, ,j M   and 1, ,i N  . M  denotes the total number of alternatives of the 
dependent variable and N  denotes the sample size. Furthermore, ix  is a column 
vector of explanatory variables,   is a row vector of parameters to be estimated and 
i  is the logistic distributed random error. The unknown parameters j ’s represent 
threshold parameters to be estimated along with  , where 0    and M    
(Cameron et al., 2005). Finally, the probability that observation i  will choose 
alternative j  is: 
      *1 1i j i j j i j iP y j P y F x F x                ,  (2) 
where F  is the standard logistic cumulative distribution function  







Finally, the marginal effect of an increase in an independent variable for the j  -th 
response is given by (Mallick, 2009) 
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This study of a nationally representative sample in Croatia reveals that 52.1 percent of 
respondents reported that tax evasion is never justifiable (high level of tax morale), 
26.0 percent of respondents have low tax morale, while 8.4 and 13.5 percent have 
mid low and mid high tax morale, in turn. To examine which population groups more 
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The descriptive statistics reveals that women more frequently report high level of tax 
morale than man (54.6 percent compared with 49.4 percent) and that the proportion 
of declaring high level of tax morale increases as age increases. Having a high level 
of tax morale is less common among those struggling financially, those participating 
in the undeclared work and among those purchasing on informal markets. Reporting 
high level of tax morale also appears to be more prevalent in some regions (i.e. Zagreb 
and surroundings, Lika and Banovina) than the rest of the country. Those who perceive 
the size of sanctions when someone is engaged in informal activities to be higher more 
frequently reported high level of tax morale. 
 
Table 2 
Distribution of tax morale in Croatia, % of survey respondents 
 
 Tax morale 
Low  Mid low Mid high High 
Total 26.0 8.4 13.5 52.1 
Gender     
 Male 28.7 9.0 12.9 49.4 
 Female 23.6 7.8 14.0 54.6 
Age     
 15-24 31.3 11.4 17.6 39.7 
 25-39 29.6 9.3 15.7 45.4 
 40-54 26.9 9.6 13.0 50.5 
 55-64 23.0 5.6 12.0 59.4 
 65+ 19.4 6.0 9.4 65.2 
Employment status     
 Employed 26.6 9.4 13.7 50.3 
 Self-employed 32.6 15.5 14.1 37.8 
 Unemployed 31.6 8.0 14.3 46.1 
 Retired 20.4 5.2 11.0 63.4 
 Student and inactive 29.6 11.5 17.8 41.1 
Financial situation     
 Struggling 29.6 6.4 14.9 49.1 
 Maintaining 22.6 8.9 12.6 55.9 
 Just comfortable/ No money problems 26.1 10.6 12.7 50.6 
Household size     
 One person 22.8 4.6 15.9 56.7 
 Two persons 27.1 8.8 12.2 51.9 
 Three persons 26.7 9.7 16.6 47.0 
 Four or more people 26.8 9.4 11.1 52.7 
Region     
 Zagreb and surroundings 22.5 5.2 13.9 58.4 
 North Croatia 24.4 9.3 12.3 54.0 
 Slavonia 27.5 9.7 14.8 48.0 
 Lika and Banovina 16.4 11.5 14.8 57.3 
 Gorski Kotar, Hrvatsko Primorje and Istria 36.3 8.7 21.8 33.2 
 Dalmatia 28.8 9.1 6.7 55.4 
Participation in undeclared work     
 No 23.3 8.1 14.0 54.6 
 Yes 46.9 10.3 9.9 32.9 
Purchasing goods and services on the informal 
market     
 No 21.5 7.4 13.8 57.3 
 Yes 38.4 10.9 12.3 38.4 
Expected sanctions     
 Normal tax or social security contributions 
due, but no fine 27.6 8.4 12.7 51.3 
 Normal tax or social security contributions 
due, plus a fine/ prison 20.8 8.4 14.6 56.2 
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 To determine which types of Croatian citizens display a greater statistically 
significant association to have a high level of tax morale, Table 3 illustrates the results 
of an ordered logit regression analysis. As a robustness check of the results, an ordered 
probit model and linear regression model were estimated to see if the results are robust 
considering the change of the empirical methodology. The significance and the signs 
of the coefficients are the same in all three models. Furthermore, ordered logit and 
ordered probit models provide almost the same size of the marginal effect. Therefore, 
it can be concluded that the results are robust. The results show that the propensity to 
have a high level of tax morale is greater among women, older age groups, and those 
who are not struggling financially. Many researchers show that tax morale rises with 
age. On the other hand, some of them illustrate that tax morale is stronger in the case 
of women (Torgler, 2006; Lago-Peñas et al., 2010; Hug et al., 2011; Torgler, 2012; 
Williams et al., 2016b), while Torgler (2005b) and Daude et al. (2010) show the opposite 
for the countries of the Latin America. Many researchers also state that financial 
situation increases tax morale (Torgler, 2005b; 2006; Lago-Peñas et al., 2010; Ristovska 
et al., 2013), while Daude et al. (2010) get negative correlation between satisfaction 
with financial situation and the high level of tax morale. 
 
Table 3 
Ordered logit regression analysis of the tax morale determinants in Croatia 
 
 Coefficient (Standard error) Marginal 
effect 
Female           0.161 (0.095)*      0.037 
Age           0.017 (0.004)***      0.004 
Employment status (RC: Unemployed)   
 Employed           0.097 (0.144)             0.022 
 Self-employed          -0.259 (0.245)            -0.059 
 Retired           0.160 (0.184)             0.037 
 Student and inactive          -0.081 (0.185)            -0.019 
Financial situation (RC: Struggling)   
 Maintaining           0.336 (0.111)***      0.077 
 Just comfortable/ No money problems           0.206 (0.128)*            0.047 
Household size (RC: One person)   
 Two persons          -0.138 (0.136)            -0.031 
 Three persons           0.056 (0.147)             0.013 
 Four or more people           0.218 (0.145)             0.049 
Region (RC: Zagreb and surroundings)   
 North Croatia          -0.189 (0.148)            -0.043 
 Slavonia          -0.329 (0.143)**     -0.076 
 Lika and Banovina           0.003 (0.176)             0.001 
 Gorski Kotar, Hrvatsko Primorje and Istria          -0.856 (0.150)***     -0.196 
 Dalmatia          -0.185 (0.144)            -0.042 
Participation in undeclared work          -0.578 (0.174)***     -0.132 
Purchasing goods and services on the informal 
market          -0.622 (0.110)***     -0.142 
Expected sanctions (RC: Normal tax or social 
security contributions due, but no fine)   
 Normal tax or social security contributions due, 
plus a fine / prison           0.278 (0.105)***      0.063 
Number of observations 2,000 
Number of imputations 25 
Prob > F 0.000 
Source: Authors’ work based on the representative survey of 2,000 individuals in Croatia 
Notes: (1) We report the marginal effects for the highest score of the tax morale index (4) 
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 The findings also illustrate that there are statistically significant correlations between 
the regions and the level of tax morale. More precisely, according to our research 
those living in Slavonia or in Gorski Kotar, Hrvatsko Primorje and Istria have a lower level 
of tax morale than others. As Williams et al. (2016b) show for the European Union, the 
results indicate that participants in the undeclared work and purchasers of goods and 
services on the informal market have a significantly lower level of tax morale than 
others. Indeed, participation in undeclared work decreases the probability of 
reporting the highest tax morale by 13.2 percentage points, while purchasing goods 
and services on the informal market decreases it by 14.2 percentage points (please 
see Table 3 and Figure 1). The additional finding is that the expected size of sanctions 
when someone is engaged in informal activities have also an impact on the tax 
morale. Furthermore, marginal effects show that those perceiving the expected 
sanctions for participation in informal activities as "normal tax or social security 
contributions due, plus a fine or prison" have by 6.3 percentage point higher 
probability of reporting the highest tax morale than others. 
 
Figure 1 
Marginal effects on probability of high level of tax morale, % 
 
 
Source: Authors’ work based on the representative survey of 2,000 individuals in Croatia 
Notes: For categorical variable: Financial situation the marginal effect reflects the difference 
between the financial situation “Maintaining” and “Struggling”.  
 
Discussion and conclusion 
Torgler et al. (2009) define tax morale "as the intrinsic motivation to pay taxes. It 
measures an individual’s willingness to pay taxes, in other words, the moral obligation 
to pay taxes or the belief that paying taxes contributes to society". Using ordered logit 
model, this research analyses the determinants of the tax morale in Croatia. The results 
of the research are in line with those obtained by various previously realised surveys in 
other countries - that tax morale is greater among women and older age groups 
(Torgler, 2005b; Torgler, 2006; Lago-Peñas et al., 2010). Being in a better financial 
situation and perceiving the high level of sanction for participation in informal activities 
also increases the probability of reporting the highest level of tax morale. Tax morale 
itself has many aspects, which are under the influence of a variety of factors. The 
measures for enhancement of the tax moral are in the field of the tax legislation and 
tax policy, but also out of it. The tax system should be simple, stable, and predictable, 
have low tax rates and a broader tax base, almost without exemptions and 
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Unnecessary complicated labour law and constant changes in the tax structure and 
regulations are often used as a justification by those who considered playing against 
the rules of the game or are operating in the unofficial economy as morally 
acceptable. Such behaviour is also stimulated by the fact that the law-makers and 
responsible authorities (sometimes) fail to provide or implement penalties for 
undesirable forms of the tax conduct. However, the most important factor for 
achieving an improved tax morale is a strong and sustained economic growth; 
because in a prosperous and developed economy, most citizens are ready to bear 
their tax obligation if they feel that tax system is just and/or that the tax burden is 
distributed fairly among the population. A well-designed and administered tax system 
enables adequate incentives for investment and growth, and helps - together with 
targeted social spending policies - to improve income distribution and the fairness of 
the tax system. A lower tax morality and a feeling of unfairness of the state regarding 
the use of collected taxes leads to greater willingness of individuals and business units 
to participate in the hidden economy and increase the tax evasion. The way to raise 
tax morale is by rational behaviour in the spending of the state budget. Taxpayers who 
notice that taxes are wisely and efficiently spent on quality public services have 
greater incentives to comply with tax laws. However, if the state spends public 
revenues in a reckless mode, does not respect the rule of law, provides inadequate 
public services, citizens will likely be evading the payment of taxes. Stubborn taxpayers 
that still attempt to evade payment of taxes would have to be convinced that 
compliance with tax laws and the payment of taxes brings a greater benefit to society 
than avoiding the paying taxes. 
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